160 grader i reaktor 3 not a problem
'Funny bunny' yeah right
Senaste från IAEA
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/tsunamiupdate01.htmlsamt publicerade en preliminär rapport 2 juni med sammanfattning av vad som hänt
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/missionsummary010611.pdfThe main preliminary findings and lessons learned are:
• The Japanese Government, nuclear regulators and operators have been
extremely open in sharing information and answering the many questions of
the mission to assist the world in learning lessons to improve nuclear safety.
• The response on the site by dedicated, determined and expert staff, under
extremely arduous conditions has been exemplary and resulted in the best
approach to securing safety given the exceptional circumstances. This has been greatly assisted by highly professional back-up support, especially the
arrangements at J-Village to secure the protection of workers going on sites.
• The Japanese Government’s longer term response to protect the public,
including evacuation, has been impressive and extremely well organized. A
suitable and timely follow-up programme on public and worker exposures and
health monitoring would be beneficial.
• The planned road-map for recovery of the stricken reactors is important and
acknowledged. It will need modification as new circumstances are uncovered
and may be assisted by international co-operation. It should be seen as part of
a wider plan that could result in remediation of the areas off site affected by
radioactive releases to allow people evacuated to resume their normal lives.
Thus demonstrating to the world what can be achieved in responding to such
extreme nuclear events. • The tsunami hazard for several sites was underestimated. Nuclear designers
and operators should appropriately evaluate and provide protection against the
risks of all natural hazards, and should periodically update these assessments
and assessment methodologies in light of new information, experience and
understanding.
• Defence in depth, physical separation, diversity and redundancy requirements
should be applied for extreme external events, particularly those with common
mode implications such as extreme floods.
• Nuclear regulatory systems should address extreme external events
adequately, including their periodic review, and should ensure that regulatory
independence and clarity of roles are preserved in all circumstances in line
with IAEA Safety Standards.
• Severe long term combinations of external events should be adequately
covered in design, operations, resourcing and emergency arrangements.
• The Japanese accident demonstrates the value of hardened on-site Emergency
Response Centres with adequate provisions for communications, essential
plant parameters, control and resources. They should be provided for all
major nuclear facilities with severe accident potential. Additionally, simple
effective robust equipment should be available to restore essential safety
functions in a timely way for severe accident conditions.
• Hydrogen risks should be subject to detailed evaluation and necessary
mitigation systems provided.
• Emergency arrangements, especially for the early phases, should be designed
to be robust in responding to severe accidents.